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INTRODUCTION

Discovery in modern business litigation increasingly has caused
corporate clients to seek preventive legal advice from their attorneys
about whether to dispose of potential "smoking-gun" evidence contained in their files. Attorneys are asked to approve clients routine
document destruction programs. In some cases, lawyers are questioned as to the propriety of destroying damaging evidence in the client's possession that the opponent in a pending proceeding has
requested the client to produce. At other times, the client informs the
attorney that it already has disposed of a document that suddenly
appears relevant to litigation.'
There is a clear consensus on the lawyer's ethical obligations that
arise in these situations. Prior to a discovery request by the opponent
or an appropriate court order in pending litigation, the attorney may
freely advise his client to destroy potentially adverse evidence in its
possession. Indeed, the ethical duty of client loyalty may require the
attorney to inform his client that document destruction is the only
prudent course of action. An attorney proceeding in this manner is in
full compliance with prevailing interpretations of the ethical rules.
Because this type of behavior on the part of lawyers can impede the
administration of justice - even though there is no violation of ethical regulations - commentators writing on document destruction
have uniformly called for reform of the ethical codes and federal and
state law. 2 All are in agreement that prevailing ethical rules are
I. See S. GILLERS & N.

DORSEN, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND

ETHICS 413 (1985).
The lawyer realizes that there are documents in the client's file that can be used against it.
But either the lawsuit has not yet begun or, if it has begun, no discovery request for those
documents has been served. Can the lawyer tell the client to destroy the documents? Can
the lawyer say nothing, even though he knows the client is intending to destroy the documents? Must the lawyer tell the client not to destroy the documents?
2. There are only four major commentaries devoted exclusively to the question of document concealment and/or destruction. See Fedders & Guttenplan, Document Retention and
Destruction: Practical Legal and Ethical Considerations, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 5 (1980);
Oesterle, A PrivateLitigant's Remedies for an Opponent's InappropriateDestructionof Relevant
Documents, 61 TEX. L. REV. 1185 (1983); Solum & Marzen, Truth and Uncertainty: Legal
Controlof the Destructionof Evidence, 36 EMORY L.J. 1085 (1987); Note, Legal Ethics and the
Destruction of Evidence, 88 YALE L.J. 1665 (1979). Two other articles, Comment, Smith v.
Superior Court: A New Tort of Intentional Spoliation of Evidence, 69 MINN. L. REV. 961
(1985); Comment, Spoliation: Civil Liabilityfor Destruction of Evidence, 20 U. RICH. L. REV.
191 (1985), deal with only one issue considered here and are of even more limited scope than
the foregoing pieces.
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among the weakest prohibitions against document destruction.' Similarly, there is a consensus that the peculiarities of federal and state
criminal procedure curtail the effective enforcement of modem day
obstruction of justice and contempt of court provisions. 4 The literature displays a sense of guarded optimism about a relatively recent
development in three jurisdictions - the tort of spoliation of evidence.5 Each author has offered his own suggestion for controlling
the problem of document destruction. 6
Each of the major authorities on document destruction approaches
the subject from a general view of the problem by asking: How can
the improper destruction or concealment of evidence be controlled?
While, for the most part, accomplishing the task of answering that
question, these commentaries fail to guide judges and practitioners in
responding to the practical realities of destruction in modem business
litigation. That is the purpose of this article - to pose and answer
the question: What are the considerations and courses of action open
to an attorney who either is asked by his client for advice in this area
or who encounters an opponent who has destroyed or is concealing
evidence?
Part II of this article describes the ethical parameters of an attorney's conduct in cases where he is called upon to advise a corporate
client regarding its concealment or destruction of documents. Because those parameters are so broad in practice, the ethical rules are
toothless in nature. Part III examines other devices used to control
improper document destruction - sanctioning under the rules of civil
procedure, the spoliation inference, the new tort of spoliation of evidence, and the possibility of attorney malpractice liability. Although
these are actions that a practitioner should consider in response to an
opponent's wrongdoing, they may not prove to be effective in cases of
egregious document destruction. In part IV, the proposals set forth in
the major commentaries are reviewed and analyzed. Finally, part V
presents an alternative strategy that courts and practitioners may

3. See discussion infra at Part II.
4. See discussion infra at Part III.
5. See discussion infra at Part IV.
6. See Oesterle, A PrivateLitigant's Remediesfor an Opponent's InappropriateDestruction
of Relevant Documents, 61 TEX. L. REV. 1185, 1240-41 (1983); Solum & Marzen, Truth and
Uncertainty: Legal Control of the Destruction of Evidence. 36 EMORY LJ. 1085, 1191-94
(1987); Note, Legal Ethics and the Destruction of Evidence, 88 YALE L.J. 1665, 1672-74
(1979).
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wish to use in dealing with document destruction. Based on three
hypothetical cases in which an opponent has damaged or conceals evidence, the article proposes two amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
II.

THE TOOTHLESS NATURE OF CURRENT ETHICAL RULES

A number of devices exist to prevent improper document destruction. Primary among these are the ethical codes governing the conduct of attorneys and the federal and state laws that are incorporated
into the ethics regulations. Current provisions essentially require the
violation of a law to trigger any professional sanction.
The prevailing ethics provisions do little to effectively deter the
types of evidence destruction that may impede the administration of
justice." The Model Code of Professional Responsibility does not specifically delineate the ethical limits on a lawyer's conduct with respect
to the destruction of documents. Those boundaries are a product of
several ethical provisions, including Disciplinary Rules 7-102(A)(3)
and 7-109(A), Ethical Consideration 7-27, and Model Rule 3.4:8
DR 7-102(A)(3): In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not...
[c]onceal or knowingly fail to disclose that which he is required by law
to reveal.
DR 7-109(A): A lawyer shall not suppress any evidence that he or his
client has a legal obligation to reveal or produce.
EC 7-27: Because it interferes with the proper administration of justice,
a lawyer should not suppress evidence that he or his client has a legal
obligation to reveal or produce.
MR 3.4(a): A lawyer shall not ... unlawfully obstruct another party's

access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document or
7. See Note, Legal Ethics and the Destruction of Evidence, 88 YALE L.J. 1665, 1666
(1979)("Yet the Code of Professional Responsibility... fails to resolve the problems that arise
when it appears that a client's position can be improved by destroying evidence.").
8. Government prosecutors possess unique ethical obligations. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-103(B).
A public prosecutor or other government lawyer in criminal litigation shall make timely
disclosure to counsel for the defendant, or to the defendant if he has no counsel, of the
existence of evidence, known to the prosecutor or other government lawyer, that tends to
negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the degree of the offense, or reduce the punishment. Id.
This Article concerns itself exclusively with civil litigation and, therefore, sets aside any discussion of document concealment or destruction in criminal matters.
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other material having potential evidentiary value. A lawyer shall not
counsel or assist another person to do any such acts . ..."
MR 3.4(d): A lawyer shall not... in pretrial procedure... fail to make
reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally proper discovery request by an opposing party ....

These ethics provisions are permutations of the broad prohibition
against an attorney counseling or participating in illegal activity.9
Attorneys in some cases have been disciplined for abridging the
foregoing ethical rules. As recently as 1985, the Supreme Court of
Arizona imposed a two-year suspension on an attorney who violated
DR 7-102(A)(3) by willfully misrepresenting his client's assets and
liabilities to a court."0 Similarly, the violation of DR 7-109(A) has
served as grounds for discipline. In Sullins v. State Bar, 1 a lawyer
was publicly reproved for intentionally misleading the court by concealing the existence of a letter pertinent to a matter before the
court.12 In re Nixon 13 involved the disbarment of President Nixon for
attempted obstruction of investigations by the FBI and Department of
Justice. 4 In a larger number of cases, attorneys have been reprimanded severely for violation of Model Rule 3.4(a). 5
The specific laws that restrict the disposition of documents and
other evidence include 18 U.S.C. § 1503, 18 U.S.C. § 401(3), state law
9. See Note, Legal Ethics and the Destruction of Evidence, 88 YALE L.J. 1665, 1666
(1979) "[P]rovisions of the Code refer only to situations in which destruction of evidence is
illegal". Id. In addition, "[a] request involving unlawful conduct, such as conduct in furtherance of an obstruction of justice, may result in a violation of Rule 8.4(b) (prohibiting criminal
conduct)." ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 61:702 (1984).
10. See In re Ireland, 706 P.2d 352, 359 (Ariz. 1985); Davis v. State Bar, 655 P.2d 1276,
1281 (Cal. 1983)(imposing three-year suspension, in part, for attorney's willful deception of
court); see also In re James, 452 A.2d 163, 170 (D.C. 1982)(imposing two-year suspension for
misleading court).
11. 542 P.2d 631 (Cal. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 937 (1976).
12. See id. at 639.
13. 385 N.Y.S.2d 305 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976).
14. See id. at 306.
15. See, e.g., Price v. State Bar, 638 P.2d 1311, 1318 (Cal. 1982)(lawyer suspended for
altering evidence); In re Jones, 487 P.2d 1016, 1023 (Cal. 1971)(lawyer suspended for
fabricating evidence and later suggesting evidence to contrary be destroyed); Reznick v. State
Bar, 460 P.2d 969, 974 (Cal. 1969)(lawyer suspended for altering evidence to create defense);
In re Williams, 23 N.W.2d 4, 9 (Minn. 1946)(disbarment based upon destruction of evidence
clearly necessary in possible subsequent litigation); In re Bear, 578 S.W.2d 928, 937 (Mo.
1979)(lawyer reprimanded for erasing tape recorded evidence); Bar Ass'n v. Zaffiro, 399
N.E.2d 549, 551 (Ohio 1980)(suspension based on lawyer's destruction of files on five fraudulent worker's compensation claims).
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and applicable federal and state statutes or regulations that1 6deal expressly with the retention of particular business documents.
Section 1503, the federal obstruction of justice statute, provides for
fines or imprisonment of any person who "obstructs, or impedes, or
endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of
justice." 1 7 Courts have construed the phrase "due administration of
justice" to prohibit the willful destruction of tangible evidence"8 relevant to any ongoing or pending matter; 9 however, section 1503 does
not apply to conduct that occurs in advance of the filing of a complaint in federal court. 20 At least one state supreme court has ordered
the two-year suspension of an attorney based partially on his conviction under section 1503 for endeavoring to obstruct justice.2 ' Thus,
this provision does not prohibit advice by the attorney to destroy documents before a suit has been instituted. Moreover, "[t]he reported
document destruction cases brought under section 1503 have almost
16. Solum and Marzen argue that, contrary to standard interpretations, the concept of
illegality contained in the ethical provisions should not be limited to criminal law violations
but should extend to violations of discovery law and tort law as well. See Solum & Marzen,
Truth and Uncertainty: Legal Control of the Destruction of Evidence, 36 EMORY L.J. 1085,
1126 (1987). Moreover, they assert that because the criminal law of destruction of evidence is
a "poor choice," the illegalities punishable by the ethical rules could encompass abridgments
of judicial orders or even commission of the tort of intentional spoliation of evidence. See id.
at 1127. This innovative approach to controlling document destruction is a positive one.
From a practical perspective, however, it seems unlikely to take hold in federal and state
courts. In Part IV, this article offers a new practice that courts might adopt as an alternative
means of reaching the same objective.
17. 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1976). Two related statutes are sections 1505 and 1510. See id.
§§ 1505, 1510. Section 1505 concerns the obstruction of proceedings before departments,
agencies, and committees, and applies only after administrative or legislative investigations
have commenced. See id. § 1505. Section 1510 contains penalties for interference with the
transmission of information to criminal investigators. See id. § 1510. These two sections are
not immediately relevant to the present discussion. See generally Solum & Marzen, Truth and
Uncertainty: Legal Control of the Destruction of Evidence, 36 EMORY L.J. 1085, 1108-13
(1987).
18. See United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 851-52 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1157 (1982).
19. See United States v. McKnight, 799 F.2d 443, 446 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Brimberry, 744 F.2d 580, 587 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v. Solow, 138 F. Supp. 812, 814-15
(S.D.N.Y. 1956).
20. See United States v. Metcalf, 435 F.2d 754, 756-57 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v.
Scoratow, 137 F. Supp. 620, 621-22 (W.D. Pa. 1956); see also Oesterle, A Private Litigant's
Remedies for an Opponent's InappropriateDestruction of Relevant Documents, 61 TEX. L.
Rr- "0, 115, 1201 (1983).
21. See Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Vesich, 476 So. 2d 811, 815 (La. 1985).
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all involved selective destruction of documents.22 When documents
are destroyed routinely and there is no outstanding document request
or subpoena, it is difficult to establish the necessary criminal intent."23
As Professor Oesterle has commented,"[i]n practice ... the prohibi24
tion is toothless.
However, a lawyer, who prior to the filing of a complaint advises
his client to destroy evidence, may be found guilty of conspiracy to
commit obstruction of justice. In United States v. Perlstein,25 the
Supreme Court refused to review the conviction of an attorney who
advised his client to destroy certain documents if a proceeding were
brought.26 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit stated:
While it is true that the obstruction can arise only when justice is being
administered, that is to say when a proceeding is pending, there is nothing to prevent a conspiracy to obstruct the due administration of justice
in a proceeding which becomes pending in the future from being cognizable under section 37 (the antecedent of present conspiracy statute, 18
U.S.C. § 371).27
But as Oesterle points out, "[a]n illegal conspiracy is extant under
Peristein only if an attorney advises a client, before his opponent files
a complaint, to destroy records after that complaint is filed .... 2
Section 401(3) is the federal contempt statute. It empowers a federal court to punish by fine or imprisonment contempt of its authority
in the form of "[d]isobedience or resistance of its lawful writ, process,
order, rule, decree, or command."2 9 This section conditions a violation on failure to obey a preexisting court order to preserve or produce documents for discovery; thus, destruction of documents before
any order issues is not punishable under section 401. Therefore, section 401 is of even more limited use than is section 1503.
From the perspective of the private litigant, a major deficiency with
each of these federal statutes is that "the final choice of whether even
22. Fedders & Guttenplan, Document Retention and Destruction: Practical,Legal and
NOTRE DAME LAW. 5, 21 (1980).

Ethical Considerations, 56
23. Id.

24. Oesterle, A Private Litigant'sRemedies for an Opponent's InappropriateDestruction of
Relevant Documents, 61 TEX. L. REV. 1185, 1201 (1983).
25. 126 F.2d 789 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 678 (1942).

26. Id. at 792.
27. Id. at 796.
28. Oesterle, A Private Litigant's Remedies for an Opponent's InappropriateDestruction of
Relevant Documents, 61 TEX. L. REV. 1185, 1196 (1983).

29. 18 U.S.C. § 401(3) (1976).
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to bring the matter to a hearing is not the party's; a federal prosecutor
or, in the case of contempt, the court, must agree to pursue the complaint."30 A prosecutor's refusal to prosecute is virtually final.3"
Although some states lack any law against the destruction of evidence, 32 a number of state laws make it illegal to tamper with or fabricate physical evidence. The primary difference between these statutes
is the scope of activity covered by the different laws. For example,
laws in a few states prohibit the destruction of evidence that may be
relevant to future litigation. 33 A larger number of states prohibit document destruction in situations in which the actor "believes" that a
proceeding is pending or about to take place.34 Other states, such as
Texas, provide that a person obstructs justice or commits contempt
only if he "knows" that a suit is pending or is about to be instituted at
the time he destroys evidence. 35 Texas Penal Code section 37.09(a)(1)
provides, "A person commits an offense if, knowing that an investigation or official proceeding is pending or in progress, he . . . alters,

destroys, or conceals any record, document, or thing with intent to
impair its verity, legibility, or availability as evidence in the investigation or official proceeding. ..

."

Although the few state statutes that

prohibit the destruction of evidence possibly relevant to future litigation constitute a relatively stringent foundation for the foregoing ethical provisions, the Texas statute limits the scope of these ethical rules
to situations in which an actor has positive knowledge of an existing
suit. Thus, a Texas attorney remains well within the ethical bounds
when advising his client, prior to knowledge of actual litigation, to
dispose of documents or other potential evidence.
30. Oesterle, A Private Litigant'sRemedies for an Opponent's InappropriateDestruction of
Relevant Documents, 61 TEX. L. REV. 1185, 1192 (1983).
31. See United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171-72 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935
(1965); Tonkin v. Michael, 349 F. Supp. 78, 81 (D.V.I. 1972).
32. See Solum & Marzen, Truth and Uncertainty: Legal Control of the Destruction of
Evidence, 36 EMORY L.J. 1085, 1117-18 (1987).
33. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-53-111 (1987); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-44-3-4(a)(3) (West

1985); MINN. STAT. § 609.63(1)(7) (West 1987); Mo. REV. STAT. § 575.100(1)(Vernon 1979);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 199.220 (1987); see also ALASKA STAT. § 11.56.610(a)(1) (1983).
34. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1269(2) (1987); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 215.40(2) (McKinney 1988); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4910(1) (Purdon 1983); see also State v. Johnson,

594 P.2d 514, 524-26 (Ariz. 1979); People v. Nicholas, 417 N.Y.S.2d 495, 496 (N.Y. App. Div.
1976)(construing New York provision).
35. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 37.09(2)(1)

(Vernon 1974); see also CAL. PENAL

CODE § 135 (West 1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 918.13(1)(2) (West 1985); OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. § 2921.12(A)(1) (Page 1986).
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Over 1300 federal statutes and administrative rules govern business
record retention.36 Numerous rules also exist at the state level. A
lawyer who advises his client to destroy documents in violation of
these regulations clearly is subject to criminal prosecution and professional discipline. "Most regulations, however, do not expressly provide for private enforcement, and courts have thus far refused to
' 37
create it.
Thus, in most cases, an attorney fully meets his ethical obligations
so long as he does not counsel destruction of documents anytime after
a proceeding is known to exist. As one author has explained:
If a client has foolishly kept documents on hand that will hurt his cause
if litigation later ensues, it is obviously in his interest to destroy them.
If it is not criminal to do so, a lawyer may counsel the client accordingly. And if a lawyer can so counsel a client, the basic principle of
client loyalty suggests that he should ..... 3

Should an attorney violate the law, he is subject to any of numerous
punishments, including disbarment, suspension, probation, reprimand, admonition, notification of clients and counsel, restitution, and
costs and fines.
Some commentators have suggested that ethical provisions governing attorney's obligations to the court also restrict their conduct in
connection with the concealment or destruction of evidence. Disciplinary Rule I- 102(A)(5) provides that "[a] lawyer shall not... [e]ngage
in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice." There
is little question that, in many instances, a lawyer's duty of client loyalty may require him to advise his client to destroy certain materials.
Often, such destruction will, in one way or another, prejudice the administration of justice. Thus, the foregoing disciplinary rule is far
from absolute and in most cases will bend to the higher ethical duty of
fidelity to the client.
In several instances, courts have punished violations of the ethical
rules not by traditional disbarment or suspension but by disadvantag36. See GUIDE TO RECORD RETENTION REQUIREMENTS (Jan. 1, 1981), Special Edition
of the Federal Register; see also Oesterle, A Private Litigant's Remedies for an Opponent's
InappropriateDestruction of Relevant Documents, 61 TEX. L. REV. 1185, 1210-16 & n.99
(1983).
37. Oesterle, A Private Litigant'sRemedies for an Opponent's InappropriateDestructionof
Relevant Documents, 61 TEx. L. REV. 1185, 1215 (1983).
38. 1 G. HAZARD & W. HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 372 (1988 Supp.).
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ing the attorney in the instant proceeding. Some courts have asserted
that the judiciary has a duty "to disqualify or strike an attorney from
a case who willfully obfuscates or conceals relevant facts." 39 A court
may invoke these penalties for ethical violations at any time during a
proceeding.' ° In Schmidt v. Ford Motor Co.,41 the district court removed the plaintiff's attorney from the case on the grounds that he
violated a number of disciplinary rules by willfully concealing
evidence.42
III.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF CONDUCT CONSISTENT ONLY WITH
THE ETHICAL RULES

As argued in part II, the Code of Professional Responsibility alone
is not an effective regulator of attorney conduct in regard to advising
or participating in the destruction of documents. This, however, does
not imply that the lawyer's role in document disposal is without any
restraint. It is clear that an attorney who counsels or participates in
document destruction while an action is pending or otherwise in violation of the law can subject his client to criminal liability and himself
to professional discipline. But is the attorney who conducts his practice up to the limits of "ethical" standards entirely free of risk? From
a pragmatic point of view, the answer must be no. In most instances,
advising a client to dispose of documents, whether routinely or on an
ad hoc basis, can injure the client's strategic interests along with the
lawyer's own personal interests. The types of penalties to which a
client might become subject include sanctions under federal and state
rules of civil procedure, an inference that destroyed evidence was adverse, or liability for the tort of evidence spoliation. In some situations, an attorney may find himself subject to civil liability.
A.

The Rules of Civil Procedure
An attorney who complies fully with the ethical rules but advises

39. Schmidt v. Ford Motor Co., 112 F.R.D. 216, 220 (D. Colo. 1986); see also Musicus v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 621 F.2d 742, 744 (5th Cir. 1980)(district court obliged to remedy
unethical conduct occurring in any proceeding before it); Breenbaum-Mountain Mortgage v.
Pioneer Nat'l Title Ins., 421 F. Supp. 1348, 1351 (D. Colo. 1976).
40. See General Mill Supply Co. v. SCA Serv., Inc., 697 F.2d 704, 711-12 (6th Cir.
1982)(asserting that court should sua sponte raise ethical problems involving danger to just,
speedy, inexpensive remedy, even if parties do not).
41. 112 F.R.D. 216 (D. Colo. 1986).
42. See id. at 221.
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his client to dispose of particular documents in anticipation of future
litigation, can expose his client to sanctions under the rules of
procedure.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 empowers the federal courts to
take certain matters as established, to restrict a party's introduction of
evidence, to strike pleadings, to dismiss an action, or to hold the party
in contempt, in circumstances where it has obstructed the discovery
of true facts by destroying or concealing evidence." Similarly, rule
215 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes Texas courts to
make such orders "as are just" where a party fails to comply with an
order of the court or discovery request. Such orders include cessation
of a disobedient party's discovery power, the payment of an opponent's attorney's fees and expenses, striking out of pleadings, and barring the disobedient party from supporting or opposing designated
claims or defenses.
The federal courts have held that the existence of a prior court order is not a prerequisite to the invocation of the foregoing sanctions."
In Bowmar Instrument Corp. v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 4 for example, the plaintiffs asked for rule 37(b) sanctions based on the destruction of documents before the complaint had been filed.' According
to that court, such sanctions were appropriate because "the defendant, with knowledge that this lawsuit would be filed, willfully destroyed documents which it knew or should have known would
'
constitute evidence relevant to this case." 47
Similarly, in Lewis v.
Darce Towing Co., Inc.," the court opined that "even where no specific court order is involved, the district court has broad discretion to
render discovery and evidentiary rulings necessary to ensure a fair
43. See Lewis v. Darce Towing Co., Inc., 94 F.R.D. 262, 265-66 (W.D. La. 1982).
44. See Professional Seminar Consultants, Inc. v. Sino Am. Technology Exch. Council,
Inc., 727 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1984). But cf 4A J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 37.03[2] (2d ed. 1982)(arguing rule 37(b) sanctions may be invoked only after violation
of court order); 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2289
(1972)(same argument as Moore).
45. 25 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 423 (N.D. Ind. 1977).
46. See id. at 426.
47. Id. at 427; see also William T. Thompson Co. v. General Nutrition Corp., 593 F.
Supp. 1443, 1455 (C.D. Cal. 1984)(sanctions imposed against litigant who is notified that documents and information in possession are relevant to litigation or potential litigation and destroys them). But see William T. Thompson Co. v. General Nutrition Corp., 104 F.R.D. 119,
122 (C.D. Cal. 1985)(limiting an award of monetary sanction under Rule 37(b) to period after
court's first discovery order).
48. 94 F.R.D. 262 (W.D. La. 1982).
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'
and orderly trial."49
This tendency to bring pre-litigation document
destruction within the scope of the rules of civil procedure was also
evident in two other major cases, United States v. InternationalBusiness Machines Corp.5o and In re Agent Orange ProductLiability Litigation."' In fact, in the latter, the court found an obligation on the
defendant, arising out of nothing more than the rules of procedure
themselves, to preserve documents that the plaintiff later requested.52
Although the ethical rules may permit document destruction up to
the point of the inception of actual litigation, the precedent under the
federal procedural rules forcefully suggests that sanctions against a
party are proper where, before a lawsuit is initiated, that party intentionally places itself in a position in which it is unable to comply with
later discovery requests. 3 The leap to the state rules of civil procedure is a relatively easy one. For example, in 1987, the Supreme
Court of Nevada, acting pursuant to Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure
37(b), held that "even where an action has not been commenced and
there is only a potential for litigation, the litigant is under a duty to
preserve evidence which it knows or reasonably should know is relevant to the action."' 54 In that particular case, the plaintiff's negligent
failure to preserve evidence took place over two years before a complaint was ever filed and nearly three years before a production request for the evidence was issued. 5 5 On this basis, the court sustained
the lower court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the
56
defendant.
Solum and Marzen found that courts will impose discovery sanctions for willful destruction, and sometimes, for the negligent destruction of evidence,5 7 but not for a party's inadvertent destruction.58

49. Id. at 265.
50. 66 F.R.D. 189 (S.D.N.Y 1974). In this case, the court held that "the Government
had an obligation to preserve all documents specifically requested that were relevant to this
litigation." Id. at 194.
51. 506 F. Supp. 750 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
52. See id. at 751.
53. See Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 208-09 (1958).
54. Fire Ins. Exch. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 747 P.2d 911, 914 (Nev. 1987).
55. See id. at 912-13.
56. See id. at 913.
57. See National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors v. Turnage, 115 F.R.D. 543, 554 (N.D.
Cal. 1987Xevidence of willful or reckless action by party in obstructing discovery not required
to sanction party).
58. See Solum & Marzen, Truth and Uncertainty: Legal Control of the Destruction of
Evidence, 36 EMORY L.J. 1085, 1096-97 (1987).
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However, there is evidence that when courts have applied such sanctions, they have proven to be quite severe. In the recent case of Telectron, Inc. v. Overhead Door Corp., 9 the court discovered "a clear
picture of willful and prejudicial discovery abuse, requiring imposition of the strictest of sanctions."' In that case, the court not only
awarded attorney's fees and costs to the plaintiff, but also entered a
default judgment against the defendant. 61 In William T Thompson
Co. v. General Nutrition Corp.,62 the district court found that even
though the defendant had notice prior to litigation that certain types
of records would be discoverable in a lawsuit, it intentionally failed to
preserve them, and in fact, continued to destroy those records
throughout the course of the litigation. 63 So great was the destruction, that the plaintiff's ability to obtain a "full and fair" trial was
almost entirely impaired. 64 The court awarded the plaintiff $453,312
in monetary sanctions, dismissed defendant's complaint against the
plaintiff, and imposed the "ultimate" sanction of striking GNC's answer and entering a default.65 In another suit, In re Air Crash Disaster
Near Chicago, Illinois on May 15, 1979," the courts ordered defendant that had destroyed documents in advance of litigation to bear all
of the expenses borne by the opponent in having to compensate for
the lost information.67 In Fautek v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc.,68
the district court awarded plaintiffs' costs and attorney's fees caused
by the defendant's intentional, reckless, or negligent concealment of
existing evidence.69 Simply from a strategic point of view, advising a
client to destroy documents on an ad hoc basis in advance of litigation
may be a very risky proposition.

59. 116 F.R.D. 107 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
60. Id. at Ill.
61. See id. at 135-37.
62. 593 F. Supp. 1443 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
63. See id. at 1446.
64. See id. at 1451.
65. See id. at 1456; see also William T. Thompson Co. v. General Nutrition Corp., 104
F.R.D. 119 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
66. 90 F.R.D. 613, 621 (N.D. Il. 1981)(defendant "must reimburse plaintiffs for costs
and fees related to all depositions, court appearances, or motions dealing with the [destroyed
report] or which might have been unnecessary had the... report not been destroyed").
67. Id.
68. 96 F.R.D. 141 (N.D. Ill.
1982).
69. See id. at 146-47; see also Lewis v. Darce Towing Co., 94 F.R.D. 262, 272 (W.D. La.
1982)(excluding all information obtained by plaintiff in process of destroying evidence).
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The Spoliation Inference

Both federal and state courts often allow the factfinder to draw a
presumption against a party that intentionally destroys evidence that
the evidence would have been unfavorable to the cause of the spoliator.7° In Bird Provision Co. v. Owens Country Sausage, Inc., the federal district court opined that "it is elementary in the law of evidence
that when a party destroys, fabricates or alters evidence, the Court
properly may draw inferences unfavorable to the spoliator. ' '72 In Alexander v. National FarmersOrganization, a the Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit held that it was improper for the district court not
to draw adverse inferences against a party that engaged in willful suppress,)n and destruction of evidence. 74 "[I]f discovered, evidence of
the destruction may be admissible in evidence at the trial as a circum75
stance showing consciousness of guilt or liability."
As Solum and Marzen correctly suggest, there remains significant
disagreement about the exact parameters of the spoliation inference.76
Historically, courts have been hesitant to invoke the inference without
some proof that the spoliator acted intentionally. However, in Vick v.
Texas Employers Commission,7 7 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit allowed the inference against a party whose negligence had
caused the loss of evidence.78 Moreover, just this past year, the Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit invoked a "rebuttable presumption"
against a defendant based on its negligent destruction of crucial evi70. See, e.g., National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors v. Turnage, 115 F.R.D. 543, 557
(N.D. Cal. 1987); Bird Provision Co. v. Owens Country Sausage, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 744, 751
(N.D. Tex. 1974), aff'd, 568 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1978); Kroger Stores, Inc. v. Hernandez, 549
S.W.2d 16, 17 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); H.E. Butt Grocery Co. v.
Bruner, 530 S.W.2d 340, 343 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, writ dism'd). "Courts appear
willing to give a specific jury instruction, if requested, on the inference to highlight the matter
for the jury." Oesterle, A Private Litigant's Remedies for an Opponent's InappropriateDestruction of Relevant Documents, 61 TEX. L. REV. 1185, 1237-38 (1983).
71. 379 F. Supp. 744 (N.D. Tex. 1974), aff'd, 568 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1978).
72. Id. at 751.
73. 687 F.2d 1173 (8th Cir. 1982).
74. See id. at 1205-06 & n.40.
75. C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICs 644 (1986); see United States v. Brashier,
548 F.2d 1315, 1325 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1111 (1977); United States v. Cirillo, 468 F.2d 1233, 1240 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 989 (1973).
76. See Solum & Marzen, Truth and Uncertainty: Legal Control of the Destruction of
Evidence, 36 EMORY LJ. 1085, 1088 (1987).
77. 514 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1975).
78. See id. at 737.
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dence. 79 The court argued that "this approach merely selects which
of two parties - the innocent or the negligent - will bear the onus of
proving a fact whose existence or nonexistence was placed in greater
doubt by the negligent party." 80
Once an adverse inference is invoked, the exact weight it is given
can vary. In some courts, the spoliation inference by itself is sufficient
to justify a verdict against the spoliator. For example, in Cecil Corley
Motor Co., Inc. v. General Motors Corp.,8 a case involving the intentional destruction of documents while litigation was pending, the
court granted "the strongest inference" against the party responsible
for the destruction of evidence.82 The Corley Motor court overturned
a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff and granted defendant's motion
for a new trial.8 3 Similarly, in H.E Butt Grocery Co. v. Bruner 4 , a
Texas court explained that:
Such a presumption is not evidence, but rather a rule of procedure or an
"administrative assumption" which "vanishes" or is "put to flight"
when positive evidence is introduced .... Such a presumption when
unrebutted ... may fully establish a fact in issue, not as evidence, but as
an artificial
legal equivalent to the evidence otherwise necessary to do
5
SO.

8

In other courts, the inference is merely one consideration.
In many cases, the evidentiary inference raised by document destruction does not offset the loss of critical evidence. As Judge
Thompson opined in Barker v. Bledsoe, 6 "[T]he tampering, destruction or suppression of evidence raises only a presumption that such
evidence would have been unfavorable to the party responsible for
doing it . . . . A presumption as to certain evidence is simply not
sufficient to protect against such conduct. '8 7 The court argued that,
in cases of serious negligent or intentional destruction of evidence, it
was "required" either to dismiss the suit or otherwise eliminate the

79. See Welsh v. United States, 844 F.2d 1239, 1248 (6th Cir. 1988).

80. Id. at 1249.
81. 380 F. Supp. 819 (W.D. Tenn. 1974); see also Bar Ass'n v. Zaffiro, 399 N.E.2d 549,
550-51 (1980)(attomey received indefinite suspension for destruction of evidence).
82. Cecil Corley Motor Co., 380 F. Supp. at 859.
83. See id.
84. 530 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. Civ. App.-1975, writ dism'd).
85. Id. at 344.
86. 85 F.R.D. 545 (W.D. Okla. 1979).
87. Id at 547-48.
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"ill-gotten advantage."" 8
C. The Tort of IntentionalSpoliation of Evidence
Courts in Alaska, California, and Florida, have adopted the tort of
intentional spoliation of evidence.8 9 The California court, which first
recognized this tort, analogized to cases involving intentional interference with a prospective business advantage.9 The court reasoned
that a prospective civil lawsuit is a "probable expectancy" that is to be
shielded from another person's injurious acts, clearly indicating that
the tort reaches intentional destruction of evidence before a suit is
filed. 9
In 1987, the Supreme Court of Kansas refused to recognize this tort
in a case before it on the grounds that the spoliator-defendant owed
the plaintiff no duty to preserve the evidence in his possession.92 The
court concluded that "absent some independent tort, contract, agreement, voluntary assumption of duty, or special relationship of the parties, the new tort of 'the intentional interference with a prospective
civil action by spoliation of evidence' should not be recognized in
Kansas."93
Where will (should) the Texas courts come down on this issue? In
Texas, the parameters of what constitutes an actionable tort are quite
broad. It is clear that "any intentional invasion of, or interference
with, property rights or personal liberty causing injury without just
cause is an actionable tort."94 It also is well established that, in
Texas, a cause of action or the right to recover damages is a property
right.9" Therefore, Texas courts easily could find that any destruction
88. See id. at 548.
89. See, e.g., Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456, 463-64 (Alaska 1986);
Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829, 832-33 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); Bondu v. Gurvich,
473 So. 2d 1307, 1312 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). For a brief explanation of developments in
several other jurisdictions, see Solum and Marzen, Truth and Uncertainty: Legal Control of
the Destruction of Evidence, 36 EMORY L.J. 1085, 1100 n.69 (1987).
90. Smith, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 836.
91. Id. at 836-37.
92. See Koplin v. Rosel Well Perforators, Inc., 734 P.2d 1177, 1181 (Kan. 1987).
93. Id. at 1182-83.
94. Tippett v. Hart, 497 S.W.2d 606, 609 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1973, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); see also Cooper v. Steen, 318 S.W.2d 750, 753 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1958, no writ).
95. See, e.g., Galarza v. Union Bus Lines, Inc., 38 F.R.D. 401, 404 (S.D. Tex. 1965)(right
to receive damages for personal injuries is property right in Texas), aff'd, 369 F.2d 402 (5th
Cir. 1966); Redfren v. Collins, 113 F. Supp. 892, 895 (E.D. Tex. 1953)(Texas recognizes right
to sue for damages for tort is chose in action and property within legal sense of term); Ezell v.
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of evidence that interferes with one's right to recover damages is a
cognizable tort. Whether a Texas court might require a duty to preserve evidence, as the Kansas Supreme Court did, is not clear. If an
analogy is made to Texas common law concerning the tort of interference with business or prospective contractual relations, then no such
duty may be required. The four elements of the latter tort are: at
least a "reasonable probability" that two or more parties would enter
into contractual relations, willful conduct on the part of the defendant, actual damages, and proximity between the defendant's conduct
and the plaintiff's injury.96

Soon after the decision in Smith, a second California court extended the new tort theory to include the negligent destruction of documents. In Velasco v. Commission Building Maintenance Co.,9 the
court held that "a cause of action may be stated for negligent destruction of evidence needed for prospective civil litigation." 98 Thus, the
scope of the new tort in California has become extremely broad. As
Solum and Marzen conclude, "together, Smith and Velasco provide a
powerful alternative to the spoliation inference and civil discovery
sanctions for the control of destruction of evidence relevant to civil
litigation."99
D. Attorney Liability
There is some question as to whether an attorney may be liable for
fraud in instances where he makes misrepresentations (or simply remains silent) to an opponent regarding the destruction or concealment of evidence. In Cresswell v. Sullivan & Cromwell,"° the federal
district court approved plaintiffs' attempt to sue a group of attorneys
on the grounds that they intentionally withheld the production of
Dodson, 60 Tex. 331, 332 (Tex. 1883); Renger Memorial Hosp. v. State, 674 S.W.2d 828, 830
(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1984, no writ)(cause of action is property right); Garrett v. Reno Oil
Co., 271 S.W.2d 764, 767 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.Xcause of action
is property right); Schepps v. Wilkins, 290 S.W. 909, 911 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1927, no
writ).
96. See Levine v. First Nat'l Bank, 706 S.W.2d 749, 751 (Tex. App.--San Antonio), rev'd
on other grounds, 721 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. 1986).
97. 215 Cal. Rptr. 504 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
98. Id. at 506.
99. Solum & Marzen, Truth and Uncertainty: Legal Control of the Destruction of Evidence, 36 EMORY L.J. 1085, 1106 (1987).
100. 668 F. Supp. 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
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documents during settlement discussions in an earlier action.' °1 In
1979, the federal district court fo the Western District of Oklahoma
levied costs and attorney's fees against a plaintiff's lawyer personally
for having been "directly and solely responsible" for the destruction
of evidence without notice to the opponent. 102 However, in Telectron,
Inc. v. Overhead Door Corp.,1o3 a Florida district court refused to hold

the defendant's "full-time in-house counsel" personally liable even
though he willfully and flagrantly destroyed documents."
The
court, in its fervor to punish the corporation, argued that the attorney
was not to be sanctioned because he was not acting in the capacity of
an "independent professional."'0°
In Hennigan v. Harris County,'" a Texas appellate court sustained
a claim of fraud brought against an attorney who concealed facts
when he had a professional responsibility to inform the trial court of
those facts.107 The court found "no reason why an attorney at law
could not be held liable for actionable fraud as would anyone else."' 1°
The elements necessary to establish a valid claim are: (1) misrepresentation of a material fact (or silent concealment when there is a
duty to speak'°9); (2) with intention to induce action or inaction; (3)
reliance by the plaintiff; and (4) damage.110 In a second Texas case,
the court agreed that an attorney owes no "general" duty to an opposing party, but found liability for injuries sustained by an opponent due
to the attorney's fraudulent or malicious conduct.I 1
The issue here is whether the attorney has a duty to disclose a confidential communication in which the client informs the attorney that it
101. See id. at 173.
102. See Barker v. Bledsoe, 85 F.R.D. 545, 549 (W.D. Okla. 1979).
103. 116 F.R.D. 107 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
104. See id. at 136-37.
105. Id.
106. 593 S.W.2d 380 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
107. See id. at 381-82.
108. Id. at 383.
109. See id. at 384; see also Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Harrison, 205 S.W.2d 355, 361
(Tex. 1947); Susanoil, In- v. Continental Oil Co., 519 S.W.2d 230, 235-36 (Tex. Civ. App.San Antonio 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Rowntree v. Rice, 426 S.W.2d 890, 892 (Tex. Civ. App.San Antonio 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Ruebeck v. Hunt, 171 S.W.2d 895, 896 (Tex. Civ. App.Waco 1943), aff'd, 176 S.W.2d 738 (Tex. 1944).
110. See Hennigan, 593 S.W.2d at 383; see also Stone v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 554
S.W.2d 183, 187 (Tex. 1977)(explanation of what is not misrepresentation).
111. See Likover v. Sunflower Terrace 11, Ltd., 696 S.W.2d 468, 472 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1985, no writ).
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is currently destroying or contemplating the destruction of potential
evidence. The Code of Professional Responsibility allows, but does
not compel, the lawyer to reveal the client's intention to commit the
crime."'
Although a lawyer is free to conceal his client's illegal conduct, he may
risk exposure to personal liability if he does so. If the client is eventually prosecuted, the lawyer might be charged as a participant in the3
illegality if he knew of the misconduct but took no preventive action., 1

IV.

A CRITIQUE OF PROPOSALS

Several commentators have called for substantial reform of the current system of legal controls on document destruction. This section of
the article examines and critiques alternatives proposed in three
4
commentaries."1
A.

Proposed Revision of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility

In order to clarify the lawyer's appropriate role in the decision to
destroy potential evidence, in 1979, one commentator recommended
the following new disciplinary rule, "In his representation of a client,
the lawyer shall not advise or assist in the destruction of documents,
records or other real evidence when he knows or reasonably should
know that they are relevant to any foreseeable, planned or pending
action.""' 5 Further, the writer suggested that "the Code also should
establish a rebuttable presumption that all documents are relevant af' 16
ter an action has begun."
The primary difficulty with this proposal is that its limited application to attorneys implies an extremely narrow form of controlling
document destruction by all parties. Of course, the author candidly
admits that "the problem cannot be completely solved by such a
112. Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 4-101(C)(3) (1980) states: "A lawyer may reveal ... [t]he intention of his client to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime."
113. Fedders & Guttenplan, Document Retention and Destruction: Practical Legal and
Ethical Considerations, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 5, 59 (1980).
114. See Oesterle, A Private Litigant's Remedies for an Opponent'sInappropriateDestruction of Relevant Documents, 61 TEX. L. REV. 1185, 123945 (1983); Solum & Marzen, Truth
and Uncertainty: Legal Control of the Destruction of Evidence, 36 EMORY L.J. 1085, 1191-94
(1987).
115. Note, Legal Ethics and the Destructionof Evidence, 88 YALE L.J. 1665, 1673 (1979).
116. Id.
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rule. " 7 Further, it attempts to accomplish through ethical standards
what has not and cannot be accomplished through even statutory provisions. This provision would essentially cut off advice to clients,
leaving the client free to destroy evidence. "Presumably, the writer
would hesihopes that clients unable to secure advice on the matter
' "18
records."
their
destroy
to
tate to proceed with plans
B. Proposed Revision of the Rules of Civil Procedure
Professor Oesterle has suggested substantial changes in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. First, he would introduce a new rule setting
forth a party's legal obligation to preserve records.' 19 In essence, this
rule would require a person who, at a minimum, reasonably should
foresee litigation to exercise "due care" in preserving any evidence in
his possession that is within the scope of rule 26(b) discovery.' 20
Next, Oesterle proposes a new subsection to rule 34 titled "Missing
Documents and Things." It would require a party responsible for the
unavailability of evidence to delineate specific information such as the
date of destruction, the reason therefore, the contents of the destroyed
material, and the best means of reconstruction.' 2 ' Finally, he recommends a clarification of rule 37 sanctions for parties whose lack of due
care causes the destruction of evidence. Oesterle would empower the
courts to designate certain facts or issues as established or to compel
the destroying party to pay the expenses incurred in reconstructing
such evidence.122 Once an issue is designated, the party disadvantaged would be prohibited from introducing any evidence on that issue at trial.
117. Id. at 1673 n.104.
118. Oesterle, A Private Litigant's Remedies for an Opponent's InappropriateDestruction
of Relevant Documents, 61 TEx. L. REV. 1185, 1217 (1983).
119. One similar alternative is an automatic "document preservation order." See Solum
& Marzen, Truth and Uncertainty: Legal Control of the Destruction of Evidence, 36 EMORY
L.J. 1085, 1094-95 n.44 (1987). This is a common practice in suits brought by the Securities
and Exchange Commission. See, e.g., Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Levine, 689 F. Supp. 317,
320 (S.D.N.Y 1988)(seeking order preventing document destruction and alteration); Securities
& Exch. Comm'n v. Vaskevitch, 657 F. Supp. 312, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)(seeking inter alia an
order preventing document alteration or destruction).
120. See Oesterle, A Private Litigant's Remediesfor an Opponent's InappropriateDestruction of Relevant Documents, 61 TEX. L. REV. 1185, 1240 (1983). "Potential litigants, under
the recommended rule, are on notice to preserve documents only when they have or should
have a particularized suspicion that a lawsuit is likely." Id. at 1243.
121. See id. at 1240.
122. See id. at 1241.
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This proposed change would have positive results. Its greatest impact would be in the area of routine document destruction programs
because it creates an affirmative duty to preserve documents. In addition, the rules would prohibit destruction of documents that a party
may later intend to claim to be privileged. Under Oesterle's scheme, a
court would have an opportunity to decide on privilege objections
before a document is destroyed. 23 The deficiency with this construct
is that it is incapable of dealing with the growing problem of spoliators who deny the existence of material or who preserve evidence, yet
improperly conceal it on the basis of privilege.
C.

An IntegratedAlternative

The most recent major commentary concerning document concealment and destruction concludes with a plea for coherent judicial application of three legal controls - the spoliation inference, discovery
sanctions, and the new spoliation torts. 24 Solum and Marzen explain
that a court faced with document destruction should first determine
its objective, whether it be to restore the accuracy of a proceeding, to
punish the spoliator, or to compensate an injured party. A court that
aims for accuracy likely will wish to invoke a strong spoliation inference. Discovery sanctions such as dismissal or a default judgment
would be best in situations where the accuracy of a proceeding cannot
be restored due to spoliation.
This integrated approach certainly would be an improvement over
the historically incoherent state of the doctrine; yet, the approach essentially is nothing more in the way of a concrete proposal for reform
than has been presented in prior commentaries. Therefore, the next
section of this article suggests an alternative strategy altogether one that is designed to deal with some of the most perplexing
problems of document destruction.
V.

AN ALTERNATIVE STRATEGY

Thus far, this article has examined the limitations of the ethical
guidelines and federal and state law as a means of controlling the destruction of evidence. In addition, it has been argued that other avail123. See id. at 1243-44. "Litigants are asked to preserve all privileged documents if relevant in the sense that they are otherwise discoverable under rule 26." Id. at 1244.
124. See Solum & Marzen, Truth and Uncertainty: Legal Control of the Destruction of
Evidence, 36 EMORY L.J. 1085, 1192-94 (1987).
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able controls, though potentially potent, have failed to stem some of
the most egregious cases of destruction and concealment. An example of such outrageous conduct is when a party not only conceals adverse information, but further claims that the document containing
the information never existed. As is clear, the foregoing alternatives
prove ineffective as a bar to a party's (intentional) improper assertion
of a claim of privilege for the purpose of concealing damaging
material.
This section identifies several hypothetical situations in which an
attorney encounters independent proof that his opponent has intentionally destroyed or is concealing adverse evidence. A detailed new
rule for dealing with such a situation is suggested.
A.

Counsel's Chance Discovery of a Document the Opponent
Claims It Never Generated

Hypothetical Number One: In June 1988, in the course of deposing a
former employee of the defendant corporation, plaintiff's counsel learns
of the existence of a 1984 company memorandum titled "Liquidation v.
Franchise Offering: Getting the Most from Underperforming Locations." The memo contains information highly damaging to the defendant's case. In July of 1988, plaintiff's counsel files a rule 34 discovery
request asking that the specific memorandum be produced. Defendant
responds that there is no recollection of any such memorandum being
prepared and that, in any case, no such memorandum exists in the company files.
In an October, 1988, interview of a disgruntled, former employee of
the defendant, plaintiff's counsel actually obtains a photocopy of the
1984 memorandum with substantial indicia of genuineness, i.e., the signature of the company president, the company letterhead, and an accurate and comprehensive distribution list, among other things. Out of
fear of recrimination, the former employee refuses to testify as to the
document's existence.
Soon thereafter, plaintiff's counsel - without disclosing his possession of a photocopy of the 1984 memorandum - files a rule 37 motion
to compel, to which the defendant again responds with lack of recollection and present non-existence of any such document. Further attempts
to have the defendant produce the document or admit its existence are
to no avail.
What should plaintiff's counsel do? It is tempting for the plaintiff's
lawyer to "'plant" the photocopy in the defendant's files during a later
document inspection. Does defense counsel have an ethical obligation
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to reveal the memorandum's existence if he is aware of it? 125
This hypothetical scenario is not at all unrealistic. In one lawsuit,
officers of defendant American Airlines and the company's attorney
denied repeatedly that American's Senior Director of Safety had ever
produced a report concerning the cause of a 1979 crash - despite
testimony from American employees that exactly such a report had
been prepared. 26 Only when the district court compelled American
to respond to discovery requests did its officers admit that such a report had in fact been prepared. 2 7 The court's sole means of "punishing" this concealment was to award the plaintiffs' their costs and fees
12
caused by American's conduct.
Difficult issues arise in instances where an attorney inadvertently
encounters "smoking-gun" evidence through a third-party and the
opponent denies any knowledge of the evidence. The present discovery structure forces the attorney in such cases to choose between a
potentially unjust outcome in the case (and, in addition, one that goes
against his client) and the use of deception to reach a fair result.
Courts should provide for these situations in the following way.
First, the attorney who encounters evidence in this manner should be
permitted to present it directly to the court and be required to demonstrate that the evidence contains substantial indicia of authenticity e.g., that it makes sense, has significant content, or that the content is
consistent with other evidence. If the court becomes convinced by the
attorney's argument that the proffered document is genuine, the court
should establish a rebuttable presumption that the evidence is what it
purports to be. Thereafter, the burden would be on the opposing
party to overcome the presumption. In appropriate cases, the court
could open the discovery schedule to allow counsel to ascertain the

125. "If the information is covered by the broad protection of the rules of confidentiality,
disclosure of information damaging to the client's interests without the client's permission is
not permitted." C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 640 (1986). Model Rule 1.6(b)(1)
forbids the disclosure of client wrongdoing unless such disclosure is reasonably necessary to
prevent the client from committing a criminal act likely to result in "imminent death or substantial bodily harm."
126. See In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Illinois on May 25, 1979, 90 F.R.D. 613,
616-20 (N.D. Iil. 1981). American's California counsel said: "I'm making a statement to you
now that this written report does not exist." Id. at 616.
127. See id. at 618. American succeeded in concealing the document's existence for approximately one full year. Id.
128. See id. at 621.
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document's authenticity. Where a court finds wrongdoing, it could
choose from its many sanctions to punish a recalcitrant party.
There might be some fear that the foregoing procedure would encourage some parties or lawyers to fabricate false documents.
Although this is a reasonable fear, it is easier for a party to "lose"
evidence or develop selective memories than it is to fabricate evidence.
In the final analysis, this suggested procedure will bring more fairness
to litigation than does the prevailing system.

B. Counsel's Discovery of Evidence That the Opponent Has Elected
to Conceal But That Possibly is Not Privileged
Hypothetical Number Two: Plaintiff's counsel in an antitrust suit files
a rule 34 request that the defendant make certain categories of material
available for inspection. The defendant complies, making available approximately 4,000 separate documents. In the course of a month-long
review of the materials, plaintiff's counsel uncovers numerous bits of
evidence that clearly establish the elements of an antitrust violation.
According to practice, he requests that the defendant provide exact facsimiles of those documents and several hundred others.
During a subsequent review of the reproductions, plaintiff's counsel
discovers that large portions of material have been "blacked-out" or
deleted on the grounds that the information is not relevant to the litigation or is confidential. The defendant's attorney censored the documents in good faith, believing all excised material to be privileged.
In the course of further investigation, a third-party tenders to plaintiff's counsel full copies of some of the documents already received by
defendant's counsel in an altered form. By comparing these materials,
plaintiff's lawyer reaches the opinion that the propriety of a few of the
excisions reasonably is open to question. The attorney cannot disclose
the independent source of these documents.
What should plaintiff's counsel do? Would it be ethical for the attorney to claim to have knowledge of the excised data due to independent
recollection or because of a handwritten note he made during the first
inspection and, on that basis, move for sanctions? Does defense counsel
have. at a minimum, an ethical obligation to reveal excised material to
the court in instances where the propriety of particular excisions is reasonably open to question?
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not expressly provide for
situations in which an opponent may have a "good faith" yet incorrect beli,-f 1at it is properly withholding certain evidence. In cases
where an attorney lacks proof that his opponent purposefully is con-

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol20/iss3/6

24

Cedillo and Lopez: Document Destruction in Business Litigation from a Practitioner's

1989]

ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

cealing evidence or has only a "sense" that documentation is being
withheld improperly, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 serves as a
disincentive to a motion for sanctions,' 29 particularly following the
1983 amendment. 13 Ironically, the authors of the 1983 amendment
possessed some fear that just such a chilling effect might result. 3 '
The Texas courts limit the risk that unfairness will arise from good
faith concealment by allowing courts to require a party to submit in
camera full, uncensored copies of all documents requested but not
necessarily produced during the discovery phase of litigation. In
Peeples v. HonorableFourthSupreme JudicialDistrict, 32 the Supreme
Court of Texas established that:
[A]ny party who seeks to exclude documents, records or other matters
from the discovery process has the affirmative duty to specifically plead
the particular privilege or immunity claimed and to request a hearing
on his motion. The trial court should then determine whether an in
camera inspection is necessary. If such inspection is ordered by the trial
court, those materials for which the33 inspection is sought must be segregated and produced to the court.

The Peeples rule saves the plaintiff's attorney in Hypothetical
Number Two from the quandry he faces in federal court. Some federal district courts normally request such a submission. For example,
129. Rule 11 provides, in part:
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be
signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name .. . . The
signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer that.., to the best

of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is
well grounded in fact .... If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of

this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person
who signed it ...an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other
party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the
pleading, motion or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
130. According to the Advisory Committee Notes concerning the 1983 amendment of
Rule 11, "[t]he new language is intended to reduce the reluctance of courts to impose sanctions
*..
by emphasizing the responsibilities of the attorney and reenforcing those obligations by the
imposition of sanctions." FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
131. The Advisory Committee wrote:
The rule is not intended to chill an attorney's enthusiasm or creativity in pursuing factual
or legal theories. The court is expected to avoid using the wisdom of hindsight and should
test the signer's conduct by inquiring what was reasonable to believe at the time the pleading, motion, or other paper was submitted. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's
note.
132. 701 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. 1985).
133. Id. at 637.
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the court in In re Air Crash DisasterNear Chicago, Illinois made exactly this request for any documents for which a claim of privilege
was raised. 3 4 In fact, "[t]he court cautioned American to review the
documents to make sure a colorable claim of privilege existed.' 5
C. Counsel's Chance Discovery of Relevant, Unprivileged Evidence
That the Opponent Willfully Concealed
Hypothetical Number Three: Assume the same facts as inHypothetical

Number Two except that, unbeknownst to the plaintiff, the defendant
and its lawyer purposefully "cleansed" some of the most damaging evidence contained in the documents, despite the fact that the undisclosed
evidence is not privileged.
In the course of further investigation, a third-party tenders to plaintiff's counsel full copies of some of the documents that he had received,
in an altered form, from the defendant. By comparing these materials,
plaintiff's lawyer learns of the opponent's wrongdoing. The attorney
cannot disclose the independent source of these documents.
What should plaintiff's counsel do? Would it be ethical for the attorney to claim to have knowledge of the excised data due to independent
recollection or because of a handwritten note he had made during the
first inspection and, on that basis, to move for sanctions? Does defense
counsel have an ethical obligation to reveal the client's wrongdoing if he
is aware of it?
Unlike Hypothetical Number Two, this scenario involves an attorney with hard evidence that his opponent has willfully concealed
proof that clearly is relevant to the litigation. Unfortunately, the attorney cannot disclose the source of that proof and no procedure exists for bringing the information to the court's attention. The Peeples
rule requiring an in camera submission to the court may be adequate
in these types of situations unless the court, in its discretion, determines that an in camera inspection is not necessary.
Thus, Hypothetical Number Three suggests the need for a modified
version of the Peeples rule. That new rule might be as follows:
a. Any party who seeks to exclude documents, records or other matters from discovery has the affirmative duty to specifically plead the
particular privilege or immunity claimed.
134. See In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Illinois on May 25, 1970, 00 F.R.D. 613,
615 (N.D. I1. 1981).
135. Id.
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b. The party must segregate those materials that are excluded from
production and submit them to the court for in camera inspection.
c. The court, or a special master in appropriate circumstances, shall
review and categorize the excluded materials as being "clearly privileged," "clearly relevant and not privileged," or "arguably not
privileged."
d. The court shall approve the party's refusal to disclose to this opponent all material that is found to be clearly privileged.
e. The court shall require the party to produce all material that is
found to be clearly relevant and not privileged. In instances where a
party has intentionally concealed evidence that is found to be relevant
and not privileged, the court shall respond with the severest sanctions
permitted. Although the application of severe sanctions is mandatory,
whether a party's improper concealment is "intentional" is within the
sound discretion of the court.
f. The court shall require the party to disclose all material that is "arguably not privileged" to the opposing counsel for his sole viewing. On
this basis, the court shall reach a decision on the excludability of the
material. In its sound discretion, the court may order a party to pay the
fees and costs incurred by its opponent.
g. In submitting materials to the court for an in camera inspection,
any party who seeks to exclude documents, reports, or other matters
from discovery may itself bring to the court's attention any material
that it has elected to withhold, but that is arguably not privileged. In
such instances, the party shall not be assessed fees and costs incurred by
the opponent in arguing for the production of that particular material.
One major advantage of such a rule is that it eliminates the chilling
effect of rule 11 on discovery in federal court. In addition, the rule
allows the judicial system to strike a balance in each situation between
the value of confidentiality in an adversary system and the interests of
third parties and society. A critical policy reason for stringent sanctions against document destruction is to deter those who may be
tempted to destroy or conceal during litigation." 6 The Supreme
Court has asserted that severe sanctions serve "not merely to penalize
those whose conduct may be deemed to warrant such a sanction, but
to deter those who might be tempted to engage in such conduct in the
absence of such a deterrent."' 37

136. See Fautek v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 96 F.R.D. 141, 147 (N.D. Ill.
1982).
137. National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643

(1976).
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CONCLUSION

The purpose of this article is to aid courts and litigators in responding to the practical realities of document concealment and destruction
in modern commercial litigation. All other things aside, present ethical provisions and federal and state laws unfortunately will not encourage attorneys to constrain client destruction of evidence or deter
lawyers themselves from participating in destruction and concealment. In the few cases where attorneys are punished under the ethical
rules, the punishments tend to be quite light - a two-year suspension
or public reproval - despite willful misrepresentations to a court.
Moreover, the federal statutes and most state laws prohibiting such
destruction normally are not activated until after a petition has been
filed or a court order has been issued. In some instances, this is far
too late to limit the damage done by a malicious opponent. The bottom line, insofar as the ethics regulations are concerned, is that any
time prior to receiving knowledge of actual litigation an attorney may
advise his client to dispose of documents or other potential evidence.
Therefore, the litigator must turn elsewhere to respond to an opponent that intentionally has destroyed evidence.
Sanctions under federal and state rules of civil procedure, the spoliation inference, and the new torts of intentional and negligent spoliation are worthy of great attention by courts and practitioners. There
is little question that federal and most state courts have adequate
powers arising out of their "inherent authority" and rule 37 to deal
with even the most serious cases of pre-filing document destruction.
Increasingly, courts are invoking the spoliation inference in response
to negligent losses of evidence as well as intentional ones. Unfortunately, in some instances, even the strongest inference will not offset
the loss of critical evidence. The spoliation tort is attractive to injured
parties because it is compensatory in nature, whereas discovery sanctions can be punitive in nature and the spoliation inference is designed
principally to restore the accuracy of a proceeding. In states such as
Texas where a cause of action is a form of property, the ground is
fertile for introduction of the new tort. In addition, the litigator always should consider a cause of action against an attorney or firm
directly involved in document destruction.
The major limitation with the foregoing responses to destruction
and with some of the alternative remedies proposed by commentators
is that they do not resolve situations in which an opponent denies a
document's existence or conceals material that is relevant and clearly
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unprivileged. This article has argued that courts should be open to
receiving materials that a recalcitrant party claims do not exist but
that contain substantial indicia of authenticity. To limit unfairness
created by good faith concealment, the federal courts should follow
the lead of the Peeples rule used by Texas courts. Also, to prevent a
party from successfully concealing evidence under an improper claim
of privilege, the courts should adopt a more detailed procedure providing for in camera submission of withheld material and severe penalties for intentional concealment of discoverable evidence.
The temptation for corporate clients to destroy "smoking-gun" evidence in their possession, whether before or after litigation has begun,
is likely to grow commensurate with society's increasii.g litigiousness
and larger damage awards. The attorney's most prudent course of
action is to keep an eye to truth - to advise his client not to destroy
evidence that is a true and accurate reflection of its conduct and activities. And when faced with an opponent that has destroyed or is concealing evidence, the attorney should take all appropriate steps to
protect his client's interest. The challenge in our adversary system is
to develop enforceable penalties necessary to offset the temptation to
deceive, and to treat deviations from truth with certainty and
effectiveness.
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ADDENDUM
At the time this Article went to press, the author learned of a major
new book by Jamie Gorelick, Stephen Marzen and Lawrence Solum,
entitled Destruction of Evidence (1989). Because copies of the two
chapters most relevant to this Article were not available for review,
they can only be referenced here for the reader's benefit. Chapter nine
which is titled, "Overview of Document Retention/Destruction Programs," and Chapter thirteen, "Consequences of Document Destruction in Commercial Litigation" may be helpful to researchers in this
field.
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